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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
KENNY JIM SHAW, 
Plaintiff/Appellant 
vs. 
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, STEEL 
DECK ERECTORS, INC., a Utah 
corporation, and JOHN DOES A to Z, 
Defendants/Appellees 
LAYTON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILT-RITE CONCRETE, INC., a 
Nevada corporation; I. CHRISTENSEN, 
INC., a Nevada corporation or 
partnership; HARV & HIGHAM MASONRY, 
a Utah corporation; and TECH STEEL, 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Case No. 930475-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLEE STEEL DECK ERECTORS, INC. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
Article VIII § 3 of the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Annotated § 
78-2-2(3)(j) (as amended); and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND THE STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that the law of Nevada rather than the law of Utah 
applies to this case and exempts those in the same employ from 
liability for the injuries Plaintiff Shaw received while working 
for a Utah based subcontractor which was performing a job for the 
State of Nevada in the state of Nevada. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that lex loci delicti was the correct choice of law 
rule to apply to this case. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a 
matter of law that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 does not always apply 
extraterritorially to Utah residents who are injured while 
working out of state. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Because each issue on appeal involves only questions of 
law this Court should review the trial court's ruling for 
correctness. City of Logan v. Utah Power and Light Co.. 796 P.2d 
697 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (1986) 
(Attached as Exhibit MA,f) 
2. Nev. Rev. Stat. S 616.085 (Supp. 1989) 
(Attached as Exhibit "B") 
3. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.270 (1986) 
(Attached as Exhibit "C") 
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4. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (as amended) 
(Attached as Exhibit "D") 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (as amended) 
(Attached as Exhibit "E") 
6. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-44 (as amended) 
(Attached as Exhibit "F") 
7. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 616.260 (1986) 
(Attached as Exhibit "G") 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of The Case 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Kenny Jim Shaw (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff"), brought a negligent tort claim against 
Defendant/Appellee, Layton Construction Company, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Layton"); Defendant/Appellee Steel Deck Erectors, 
Inc. (hereinafter "Steel Deck"); Defendant Bilt-Rite Concrete 
(hereinafter "Bilt-Rite:); and John Does A to Z (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "John Does") for injuries he claims 
to have received while working on the construction site of the 
Nevada State Prison in Ely, Nevada. Plaintiff's Complaint 
contained causes of action against all Defendants for negligence, 
res ipsa loquitur, and negligence per se. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Defendants Layton and Steel Deck were served with 
Plaintiff's Complaint. Plaintiff, however, has not yet served 
Defendant Bilt-Rite or any John Does. Steel Deck answered 
Plaintiff's Complaint asserting various affirmative defenses 
including immunity from liability from this type of action 
3 
provided by the laws of Nevada. Layton also answered Plaintiff's 
Complaint and filed Third Party Complaints against Bilt-Rite; I. 
Christensen, Inc.; Harv & Higham Masonry, Inc.; and Tech Steel, 
Inc. Layton subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's 
Complaint and Steel Deck filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Both Motions argued that Nevada law governed Plaintiff's cause of 
action and granted them immunity from his tort claim. Memoranda 
were submitted, the Motions were orally argued and on November 
26, 1991, Judge Pat Brian granted both Motions and dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint against both Defendants. 
Plaintiff appealed Judge Brian's dismissal of his 
Complaint. This Court, however, on its own Motion, dismissed 
Plaintiff's Appeal for lack of jurisdiction due to Plaintiff's 
failure to obtain a Certification of Finality from the trial 
court pursuant to Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See 
Shaw v. Layton Construction Co.. 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1993). Following dismissal of that appeal (Case No. 
920025-CA) the parties appeared before Judge Brian and on July 8, 
1993 obtained a Rule 54(b) Certification of Finality from the 
trial court. Notice of Appeal was filed on July 20, 1993, and 
this matter is again before this Court for a determination of the 
issues involved in the first appeal. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Layton, a general contractor from Utah, entered into a 
contract with the State of Nevada to construct "Phase II" of a 
maximum security prison in Ely, Nevada (hereinafter "the Nevada 
4 
Project"). (R. 3, 13, 140, 196, and 322) In order to construct 
the Nevada Project, Layton entered into subcontracts with 
subcontractors from Nevada and Utah. (R. 40, 44, 49, 55, and 106) 
Those who are parties to the action which underlies this appeal 
(Bilt-Rite Concrete, Inc., a Nevada corporation; I. Christensen, 
Inc., a Nevada corporation; Tech Steel, Inc., a Utah corporation; 
Steel Deck Erectors, Inc., a Utah corporation; and Harv & Higham 
Masonry, Inc., a Utah corporation) were all subcontractors on the 
Nevada Project. (R. 40, 44, 49, 55, 106, and 322) 
Plaintiff was hired by Harv & Higham in July of 1989, 
to work on a prison under construction in Gunnison, Utah. (R. 374 
and 376-380) Four months later, as that project neared 
completion, Plaintiff voluntarily elected to go out of state and 
join a Nevada Union in order to work on the Nevada Project. 
Plaintiff could have continued to work for his employer, Harv & 
Higham, on jobs in Salt Lake City, Orem, or Ogden, Utah. He, 
however, chose to work on the Nevada Project and joined a Nevada 
Union because his pay would almost double. (R. 377-379) 
Plaintiff was injured on February 5, 1990, while 
working on the Nevada Project. (R. 3-4, 14, 122-122, 140, 196-197 
and 243) Subsequent to his injury Plaintiff sought and received 
workers' compensation pursuant to Utah law (R. 142 and 245-246) 
and thereafter filed his lawsuit against Layton, Steel Deck, 
Bilt-Rite and John Does claiming causes of action against those 
Defendants for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and negligence per 
se. (R. 2-6A, 8-9, 12-18 and 20-22) The Defendants who were 
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served with process successfully argued to the trial court that 
Plaintiff's Complaint against them should be barred by Nevada 
law, (R. 321-329) and this appeal has been taken. (R. 345-346) 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
This appeal presents a conflict of laws problem. The 
application of Nevada law to this dispute would prevent Plaintiff 
from maintaining his negligence claim against these Defendants, 
while the application of Utah law would not do so. Because 
Plaintiff filed suit in Utah, Utah's Choice of Law rules should 
be used to decide which state's law should apply. Utah has 
consistently held that procedural matters should be decided by 
the laws of the forum state, while issues affecting the parties7 
substantive rights should be resolved by applying the lex loci 
delicti or the law of the place of the wrong. The issue on 
appeal in the instant case, Plaintiff's ability to pursue a 
negligent tort claim against these Defendants and Defendants' 
right to be free from such a lawsuit, directly impacts the 
substantive rights of the parties, and should therefore be 
resolved by applying the lex loci delicti which is the law of 
Nevada. Furthermore, Utah's workers' compensation laws do not 
create an exception to the choice of law rule of lex loci delicti 
in this case. 
If this Court concludes that lex loci delicti should 
not be used to resolve conflict of law issues where workers' 
compensation may be involved the result will remain the same 
regardless of which choice of law analysis is used. 
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The most significant contacts approach to this choice 
of law question (which looks to: the place where the injury 
occurred; the place where the conduct causing the injury 
occurred; the domicile, residence nationality, place of 
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and the place 
where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered) 
leads to the conclusion that Nevada's contacts to the incident 
which underlies Plaintiff's lawsuit are greater than Utah's 
contacts. The injury occurred in Nevada; the allegedly negligent 
conduct occurred in Nevada; some of the parties to this lawsuit 
are Utah residents and corporations, others have Nevada domiciles 
but at the time of Plaintiff's injuries all were doing business 
in Nevada; and the relationship between the parties was centered 
entirely in Nevada. 
Using an interest analysis to resolve the choice of law 
problem presented by this appeal also dictates that Nevada law 
should govern this action. Utah has a valid and legitimate 
interest in seeing that its citizens receive compensation for 
work related injuries. Plaintiff has been compensated pursuant 
to the workers' compensation laws of Utah and has various avenues 
to augment that award if it is insufficient to adequately 
compensate him for his injuries. Utah, however, has an even 
greater interest in ensuring its citizens, subcontractors, and 
general contractors can continue to seek and receive out of state 
work on an equal basis with citizens, subcontractors and general 
contractors from other states. If Nevada law is found to apply to 
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the instant case citizens and companies who are residents of Utah 
could continue to compete for out of state work on an equal basis 
with the residents of other states. Conversely, if Utah law is 
applied to this dispute, Utah citizens permitted to work on an 
out of state project as employees, subcontractors or general 
contractors would expose all others on the same job site to the 
risk of a lawsuit for negligence in the courts of this state. 
That risk would end up being eliminated by the systematic 
exclusion of Utah citizens and companies from out of state 
projects. 
A balancing of only Utah's interests dictates that 
Nevada law should govern this dispute. An interest analysis 
approach to choice of law questions, however, requires the 
interests of both jurisdictions to be considered. Nevada was and 
is the owner of the Nevada Project. Nevada is also a potential 
defendant. Nevada has an obvious and legitimate interest in 
having its own law govern disputes involving a job it 
commissioned to be completed within its borders. Nevada also has 
an interest in protecting individuals working within its borders 
and in ensuring that resident corporations and others doing 
business within the state will be protected from third party 
liability for negligence where workers' compensation is involved. 
The interests of both Utah and Nevada favor the application of 
Nevada law to this dispute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CHOICE OF LAW RULE TRADITIONALLY ADHERED 
TO IN UTAH OF LEX LOCI DELICTI SHOULD BE USED 
TO DETERMINE WHICH STATE'S LAW SHOULD GOVERN 
TBtg PISPUTE 
Plaintiff, a Utah Resident, filed a tort claim in the 
Third Judicial District Court for the State of Utah seeking to 
recover for injuries he received while working on a construction 
project in the state of Nevada for the State of Nevada. If Utah 
law governs Plaintiff's Complaint, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-62 (1953 as amended), he could maintain his negligence 
claim against the Defendants named in his Complaint as well as 
others. If, however, Nevada law is found to govern this action, 
Plaintiff's Complaint against those in the same employ which 
includes the general contractor, the subcontractors and all of 
their employees, would be barred pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 
616.560 (1986), 616.270 (1986), 616.085 (Supp. 1989) and 616.116 
(1986). This Court must decide which State's law should govern 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
When faced with a conflict of laws, the forum court 
should apply its own choice of law rules to determine the outcome 
of the conflict. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co.. 313 U. S. 
487, 491 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.E.D. 1477 (1941). Since, Utah is 
the forum for this controversy its choice of law rules should be 
used to decide this issue. In Utah, conflicts over procedural 
matters are governed by the law of the forum while conflicts over 
parties' substantive rights are resolved by applying the 
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traditional rule of lex loci delicti or the law of the place of 
the wrong. Buhler v. Maddison. 176 P.2d 118, 122 (Utah 1947). 
See also 168 A.L.R. 177; and 16 Am.Jur.2d. Conflicts of Law § 5, 
98, 99 and 118. 
This Court referred to the procedural/substantive 
characterization of conflicts questions in Rhoades v. Wright, 622 
P.2d 343, 348-49 (Utah 1980). In order to resolve the matter at 
hand, the conflict between Utah and Nevada law should first be 
classified as procedural or substantive. Procedural matters are 
those dealing with the conduct of the litigation; the machinery 
for carrying on the suit including pleading, process, evidence 
and practice, June v. Erie R.R. Co., 140 N.E. 366 (Ohio 1922); or 
the mode by which a legal right is enforced. Bohme v. Southern 
Pacific Co.. 8 Cal. App. 3d 291, 87 Cal.Rptr. 286 (Cal.App.2d 
1970). Substantive matters, on the other hand, involve the 
creation, definition and regulation of individuals' rights and 
duties. Sohm v. Bernstien. 279 A.2d 529 (Maine 1971). 
The conflict in this case involves Plaintiff's right to 
maintain a cause of action in Utah for an injury he received 
while working in Nevada and the Defendants7 right to be free from 
such a lawsuit. The conflict at hand directly affects the 
parties' substantive rights. A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation. (1990) § 88.21, 16-193. In the opening paragraph 
of the argument section of Plaintiff's Brief, Plaintiff 
acknowledges that the conflict in question "bears upon the 
substantive rights of this state's [sic] residents..." including 
10 
Plaintiff. (Plaintiff's Brief at 10) Therefore, according to the 
choice of law rule traditionally followed in Utah, the rule of 
lex loci delicti, the substantive law of the place of the wrong 
should govern actions based on that wrong. Bodrua v. United 
States of Am. and F.A.A.. 832 F.2d 136, 137 (10th Cir. 1987); 
citing Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co.. 574 F.2d 1027, 1032 
(10th Cir. 1978); Jackson v. Continental Bank & Trust Co.. 443 
F.2d 1344, 1349 n. 6 (10th Cir. 1979); Valesquez v. Greyhound 
Line. Inc.. 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989, 991 (1961), overruled 
on other grounds; Harris v. Utah Transit Auth.. 672 P.2d 217 
(Utah 1983); and Hudson v. Decker. 7 Utah 2d 24, 317 P.2d 594, 
595 (1957). 
The purpose of the rule of lex loci delicti is, and 
always has been, to promote stability in the law, predictability 
of result, justice among the parties and to prevent the scourge 
of forum shopping. 16 Am.Jur.2d Conflicts of Law §§ 5, 98, 99 
and 118. See also Northeast Utilities. Inc. v. Pittman Trucking 
Co.. 595 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Ala. 1992) and (VConner v. O'Conner. 
519 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986). The case at hand is an ideal situation 
to apply the choice of law rule of lex loci delicti and promote 
the above values. 
In some situations where the traditional tort choice of 
law rule of lex loci delicti has been rejected (in cases dealing 
with automobile guest statutes or interspousal immunity) the 
courts have focused on the fortuitousness of the place of the 
injury. See Forsman v. Forsman. 779 P.2d 218, 219-220 (Utah 
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1989). But see Wood v. Tavlor. 332 P.2d 215, 216 (Utah 1958); 
and Hudson. 317 P.2d. at 594-595. In the instant case, however, 
the converse is true. The fortuitous facts surrounding this 
dispute are the parties' domiciles. See LaBounty v. American 
Insurance Co., 451 A.2d 161, 163 (N.H. 1982), and Clark v. Clark, 
222 A.2d 205, 208 (N.H. 1966). The owner of the Nevada Project, 
the State of Nevada, was certain and known to all. The job site 
of Ely, Nevada was also permanent, continual, open, obvious and 
known to all involved. The domiciles of the general contractor, 
the subcontractors (all licensed to do construction work in the 
state of Nevada) and the individual employees (many of whom like 
Plaintiff were members of Nevada unions), however, were 
undisclosed and unknown to the others. The record does not 
indicate how many subcontractors or individual employees were 
Nevada residents. Two Nevada corporations are currently parties 
to this lawsuit and in light of the size of the Nevada Project, 
its owner and its location there are likely to be many others 
involved, including the State of Nevada. 
Because of the various domiciles of the parties and 
potential parties, applying Utah's law to Plaintiff's Complaint 
would create confusion, uncertainty and would promote forum 
shopping. Confusion and uncertainty would result when Plaintiff 
attempts to serve BiIt-Rite or any of the John Does with 
domiciles other than Utah. Plaintiff emphasizes time and time 
again that the Defendants in this case are all residents of Utah. 
(Plaintiff's Brief at 8, 9, 11 and 14) Plaintiff seems to ignore 
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the fact that his Complaint named a Nevada Corporation and 26 
John Does as Defendants in this action and that various third 
party claims have been filed against Nevada residents by Layton. 
It is likely that many of those John Does (which likely includes 
the State of Nevada) are residents of Nevada or other states. 
The application of Utah law to Steel Deck and Layton would beg 
the question what law would apply to the defendants with 
domiciles other than Utah? The application of lex loci delicti 
to this case, however, would raise no such question. It would be 
certain for all and would prevent forum shopping. 
Another question which would have to be addressed by 
this court is which law would apply if the injured party seeking 
to maintain a negligence action were not a resident of Utah? It 
is not inconceivable that one or more individuals with various 
domiciles were injured while working on the Nevada Project. If 
this court applies some rule other than lex loci delicti the 
question of which state's law should apply could become an issue 
for injuries on this or any other out of state project where a 
Utah resident, contractor or subcontractor was involved. This 
case is ideally suited to reaffirm Utah's reliance on lex loci 
delicti to resolve choice of law issues in tort to promote 
certainty, predictability and the effective administration of 
justice. 
In the case at hand "the acts alleged and complained of 
[in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint], and which give rise to 
the various causes of action enumerated [therein], occurred 
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exclusively within Ely, Nevada.11 (R. 2-3 and 13) Furthermore, 
the injuries for which Plaintiff seeks to recover were sustained 
exclusively in Ely, Nevada. (Plaintiff's Brief at 6) There is no 
dispute that Nevada is the place of the wrong. Therefore, unless 
this Court elects to undertake a new course for choice of law in 
Utah, the law of Nevada should govern the parties substantive 
rights and obligations, and bar Plaintiff's Complaint against 
Steel Deck. 
II. 
UTAH CODE ANN. SS 35-1-44(6). 35-1-54 AND 35-
1-62 DO NOT CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE 
OF LEX LOCI DELICTI 
Plaintiff argues that lex loci delicti should not apply 
to the instant situation because Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (1953 
as amended) grants individuals entitled to workers' compensation 
an action for damages against some negligent third parties, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54 (1953 as amended) allows a worker, who 
is hired or regularly employed in this state and is injured 
during the course of his employment outside of this state, to 
receive compensation according to the laws of this state. 
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it ruled, as a 
matter of law, that "Utah's Workers [sic] Compensation Act is not 
applicable extraterritorily [sic] for injuries to a Utah worker 
occuring [sic] outside the state of Utah." (R. 328 J 7) While 
the trial court's conclusion of law misstates the law as set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-54, Steel Deck contends that the 
trial court intended paragraph seven to read "Utah Code Ann. § 
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35-1-62 of Utah/s Workers' Compensation Act is not applicable 
extraterritorially for injuries to a Utah worker occurring 
outside the state of Utah." That conclusion would be the only 
position consistent with the Motions and Memoranda submitted by 
Defendants Layton and Steel Deck. (R. 166-172 and 257) 
Nevertheless, the trial court's decision is to be reviewed for 
correctness and the outcome below was correct. 
Plaintiff contends that Utah's Workers' Compensation 
statute was intended to have extraterritorial effect and cites 
dubious cases in support of that contention. Steel Deck agrees 
that Utah's legislative scheme to compensate employees who are 
injured on the job extends to employees who are injured while out 
of state. Steel Deckf however, disagrees with Plaintiff's 
interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-44(6) construing the word 
"benefits" to include "the right to bring a third party tort 
action for injuries received by the employee while temporarily 
out of state." (Plaintiff's Brief at 28) 
Reading Utah Workers' Compensation Act (Utah Code Ann. 
S § 35-1-1 through 35-1-107) as a whole, demonstrates the lack of 
logic or reason in Plaintiff's position regarding the meaning of 
"and benefits." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 and 35-1-50, (1953 as 
Amended) provide in part that an employee injured by accident in 
the course of his employment, regardless of where it occurs, 
"shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury . . . and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines . . . as provided in this chapter." Steel 
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Deck contends that the payments for "medical, nurse, and hospital 
services, and for medicines, and [] such artificial means and 
appliances necessary to treat the patient" provided for in Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-81 (1953 as amended), in addition to 
compensation, are the "benefits" referred to in § 35-1-44(6). 
Plaintiffs interpretation of "payments and benefits" is further 
undermined by the legislature's use of: the phrase "Workers7 
Compensation Benefits" in Utah Code Ann. § S 35-1-46(1), (2) and 
35-1-46.10 through .30; "compensation or other benefits in lieu 
of the compensation and other benefits provided by this title" in 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-52; and "the employee's claim for benefits 
under this chapter is wholly barred" if not brought within 180 
days in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99. (emphasis added) Using the 
term "benefits" to include an injured employee's right to sue 
negligent third parties would arguably create a 180 day statute 
of limitations on such actions. 
Plaintiff's contention that an individual's right to 
maintain a negligence action against third parties is a benefit 
of Utah's Workers' Compensation Act which should apply 
extraterritorially is not supported by statute, nor case law and 
is contrary to the legislature's intent. The language of this 
State's workers' compensation law fails to provide a basis for 
this Court to reject the long standing doctrine of lex loci 
delicti for resolving choice of law issues in negligence actions 
even where workers' compensation is involved. See Dueitt v. 
Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1182-1183 (5th Cir.). 
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III. 
NEVADA LAW SHOULD BE POUND TO GOVERN PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT WHETHER THE CONFLICT OF LAWS PRESENTED BY 
THIS APPEAL IS RESOLVED BY APPLYING A "MOST SIGNIFICANT 
CONTACTS" APPROACH: AN "INTEREST ANALYSIS"APPROACH: OR 
A COMBINATION OF THOSE APPROACHES 
Plaintiff's brief urges this Court to reject the choice 
of law rule of lex loci delicti for this case and argues for the 
adoption of a different choice of law rule for workers' 
compensation matters. The standard being advocated appears to be 
a combination of a "most significant contacts" test and an 
"interest analysis" test. If this court elects to choose a 
specialized choice of law rule to govern cases involving 
conflicts of law in workers' compensation matters Nevada law 
should still be found to govern the instant case. 
A. Nevada's Relation to the Occurrence is 
Greater than Utah's Connection, and Nevada Law 
Should be Found to Govern this Dispute if a "Most 
Significant Contacts" Test is Used to Resolve This 
Conflict of Law 
The "most significant contacts" test expounded in 
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § 145 states: 
(1) The rights and liabilities of the 
parties with respect to an issue in tort are 
determined by the local law of the state 
which, as to that issue, has the most 
significant relationship to the occurrence 
and the parties under the principles stated 
in § 6. 
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in 
applying the principles of § 6 to determine 
the law applicable to an issue include: 
(a) the place where the injury occurred; 
(b) the place where the conduct causing 
the injury occurred; 
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(c) the domicile, residence, 
nationality, place of incorporation and 
place of business of the parties; and 
(d) the place where the relationship, if 
any, between the parties is centered. 
These contacts are to be evaluated according 
to their relative importance with respect to 
the particular issue. 
i. The Injuries Sustained by Plaintiff were 
Sustained in Nevada 
The injury which underlies Plaintiff's lawsuit occurred 
in Nevada. (R. 2-4 and 12-14). In Barrinaer v. State. 727 P.2d 
1222, 1227 (Idaho 1986) the Idaho Supreme Court, in a case 
dealing with a conflict of laws in the workers7 compensation 
context, held that "of the contacts to be considered, 'none has a 
more significant relationship to the issue . . . than . . . the 
place of the injury." Id. quoting Johnson v. Pischke. 700 P.2d 
19, 24 (Idaho 1985). The Nevada Supreme Court has also 
recognized the primacy of the place of the injury in resolving 
choice of law questions arising in the context of workers' 
compensation. Tab Construction Co. v. Eighth Judicial District 
Court. 432 P.2d 90 (Nev. 1967); See also Northeast Utilities. 
595 A.2d at 1353. 
There is no question that the place of the injury which 
underlies Plaintiff's Complaint was Nevada and that that contact 
favors the application of Nevada law to this dispute. 
ii. The Conduct Causing Plaintiff's Injuries 
Occurred Exclusively in Nevada 
Plaintiff alleges that his injuries resulted from 
Defendants' negligence in failing to make safe a hole in tin 
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decking material at the Nevada Project. (R. 4-6 and 14-17) He 
also contends that "[t]he acts . . . which give rise to the 
various causes of action enumerated [in his Complaint] occurred 
exclusively within Ely, Nevada." (R. 2-3 and 13) Each 
jurisdiction has an interest in protecting those within its 
boundaries from injuries due to negligent conduct and in 
regulating such conduct. See Wood. 332 P.2d at 216-217; and 
Hudson, 317 P.2d at 595. Because the conduct involved in the 
incident which underlies this action occurred exclusively in Ely, 
Nevada, that contact also favors the application of Nevada law to 
this case. 
iii. While the Parties to this Appeal May All be 
Residents of Utah Some Unserved Defendants 
and Third Party Defendants are Residents of 
Nevada 
Plaintiff, Steel Deck and Layton are all Utah 
residents. Bilt-Rite, I Christensen and the State of Nevada, 
however, are not residents of this State. Those with Utah 
domiciles could reasonably foresee a visit to a Utah courtroom, 
but not for a personal injury action arising from alleged 
negligent conduct performed in Nevada which allegedly caused 
injuries in Nevada, on a construction project in Nevada which had 
been commissioned, directed and was owned by the State of Nevada. 
An important aspect of this factor is the place of 
business of the parties. In the instant action all of those 
involved, parties and potential parties, were doing business in 
Nevada at the time of the incident upon which Plaintiff's claim 
is based. While Utah has some connection to the occurrence via 
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some of the parties' domiciles, Nevada's relation to the parties, 
as far as this occurrence is concerned, however, is equal to or 
greater than Utah's relation, and it also favors the application 
of Nevada law to this dispute. 
iv. The Parties' Relationship was Centered 
Entirely in Nevada 
Plaintiff and his employer began their relationship in 
the State of Utah. Some of the Subcontractors also began their 
relationship with Layton in Utah. Nevertheless, Steel Deck's 
relationship with Plaintiff began, existed and ended in Nevada. 
Steel Deck had no contact whatsoever with Plaintiff prior to the 
arrival of both parties at the job site of the Nevada Project in 
Ely, Nevada. Because Steel Deck had no actual or constructive 
knowledge of Plaintiff's existence until that point in time, 
consideration of the place of the parties' relationship also 
demonstrates that Nevada is the State with the greatest contacts 
to and relationship with the occurrence and the parties involved 
in this dispute. 
B. Analyzing and Comparing the Various Interests 
of the Concerned Jurisdictions Demonstrates that 
the Interests of Both Utah and Nevada Favor the 
Application of the Immunity Provided by the Law of 
Nevada 
Some courts have rejected traditional contract and tort 
choice of law principles "in favor of the rules traditionally 
applied to workers' compensation conflicts cases." Fox v. 
Sharlow, 579 A.2d 603, 606-607 (Conn.Super. 1990); citing 
Simaitis v. Flood. 437 A.2d 828 (Conn 1980). In Wilson v. Faull, 
141 A.2d 768 (N.J. 1958) the Supreme Court of New Jersey, ruling 
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on a conflict between the workers' compensation laws of two 
states which dealt differently with a plaintiff's right to 
maintain a tort action stated: 
[t]he classification of the plaintiff's claim as one 
involving 'tort law' or 'contract law' or 'employment 
relations law,' with the consequence that the court 
need then only mechanically apply the respective choice 
of law rule, i. e., the law of the state of the injury, 
or the state where the employment contract was entered 
into, or of the state with the most significant 
contacts with the employment relation, does not in our 
opinion provide a satisfactory choice of law rule where 
the employee is not claiming compensation benefits but 
is instead seeking to maintain a common law tort 
action. 
Id. at 774. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to hold that: 
[c]hoice of law in the situation presented here should 
not be governed by wholly fortuitous circumstances such 
as where the injury occurred, or where the contract of 
employment was executed, or where the parties resided 
or maintained their places of business, or any 
combination of these 'contacts.' Rather, it should be 
founded on broader considerations of basic compensation 
policy which the conflicting laws call into play, with 
a view toward achieving a certainty of result and 
effecting fairness between the parties within the 
framework of that policy. 
Id. at 778-779. 
Other courts and authorities have adopted the reasoning 
expressed in Wilson. See Larson, A. The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation (1990) §§ 88.13 through 88.14, 16-185 through 16-
192. Recently the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the 
"decision in Wilson, foreshadowed, if it did not fully comport 
with, contemporary choice of law doctrine in which the 
determinative law is that of the state with the greatest interest 
in governing the particular issue.w Eaer v. E. T. Du Pont 
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DeNemours Co,, 539 A.2d 1213, 1217 (N.J. 1988). See also 
LaBountv, 451 A.2d at 164. In Braxton v. Anco Electric. Inc.. 
409 S.E.2d 914 (N.C. 1991), the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
rejected the application of lex loci delicti to resolve a 
conflict of laws regarding the exclusive remedy bar of two 
states' workers' compensation statutes and applied the law of the 
state whose interests it determined were paramount. Id. at 916. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts has also held that: 
[i]n situations involving a conflict of laws 
concerning the fellow employee's claimed 
exemption from liability, the better reasoned 
cases focus on the established relationship 
of the parties, their expectations, and the 
degree of interest of each jurisdiction whose 
law might be applied. 
Saharceski v. Marcure. 366 N.E.2d 1245, 1248 (Mass. 1977). 
Many courts have elected to look to the interests of 
involved jurisdictions to resolve conflicts of law in the 
workers' compensation context. If this court elects to utilize 
an interests analysis approach the law which should be applied to 
the case at bar will be the law of Nevada. 
i. Utah's Interests in Seeing its Residents 
Compensated and Enabling its Citizens and 
Residents to Continue to Seek and Receive Out 
of State Work Favor the Application of Nevada 
Law to Plaintiff's Complaint 
There is no question that Utah has an interest in 
seeing that its citizens are compensated for injuries they 
receive regardless of where the injury may be sustained. 
Cleveland v. U.S. Printing Ink. Inc., 588 A.2d 194 (Conn. 1991); 
citing Simaitis, 437 A.2d at 832. The instant case, however, 
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does not involve a choice between compensation or no compensation 
for a Utah citizen. Nor does it involve a right to supplemental 
workers7 compensation payments as in Thomas v. Washington Gas 
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 100 S.Ct. 2647, 65 L.Ed.2d 757 (1980). 
Plaintiff applied for and received his workers' compensation 
payments and benefits pursuant to Utah law. He is now seeking to 
receive additional compensation by way of a third party tort 
claim. The majority of those employees injured in the course of 
their employment cannot or choose not to seek more money by 
initiating lawsuits. In Bozo v. Central Coal & Coke Co.. 180 
P.2d 432 (Utah 1919) this Court recognized that in many cases 
workers' compensation payments and benefits are a sufficient 
remedy. 
Plaintiff contends that lf[h]is recovery from Workers 
[sic] Compensation Fund of Utah has not been adequate to meet his 
future needs" (R. 251) and that he needs and deserves an avenue 
by which to recover additional compensation. The legislature has 
provided the State Industrial Commission with continuing 
jurisdiction to modify awards and increase compensation when the 
facts so merit. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78 (1953 as amended). 
Plaintiff could also seek additional benefits pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1953 as amended) or appeal the ruling or 
order of the Industrial Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 
35-1-82.53 (1953 as amended) in order to alleviate his claimed 
problem of undercompensation. 
Plaintiffs right to compensation has been honored. 
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His medical bills, rehabilitation and training have been paid for 
and Utah's interests in that regard have been satisfied. The 
State's interest in permitting Plaintiff to seek additional 
compensation is dwarfed by its interest in ensuring his initial 
recovery of workers' compensation and benefits. LaBounty, 451 
A.2d at 164. Preventing Plaintiff from pursuing his cause of 
action against these Defendants by applying Nevada law to this 
dispute would only preclude him from trying to recover additional 
compensation by way of a lawsuit. 
Utah also has a valid and legitimate interest in 
allowing workers' compensation insurance carriers and the 
employer's of injured employees to seek subrogation from 
responsible third parties. Nevada also gives insurers and 
employers a right to subrogate against responsible third parties. 
Nevertheless, in its workers' compensation scheme co-employees 
are exempt from liability for negligence. Despite Utah's 
interest in allowing subrogation claims to be brought the main 
purpose of the workers' compensation laws is to ensure that 
injured employees are taken care of. Plaintiff has received his 
compensation payments and benefits. Utah's interest has been 
partially satisfied and its interest in allowing Plaintiff to go 
forward with his negligence action is fairly insignificant when 
the other policy considerations are looked at. 
Preventing Plaintiff from pursuing his negligence cause 
of action by the application of Nevada law may somewhat reduce 
his recovery. Allowing Plaintiff's lawsuit to proceed, however, 
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by applying Utah law to this situation would detrimentally impact 
the ability of Utah citizens, contractors and subcontractors to 
compete for, seek and receive work on out of state projects. 
Applying Utah law to this situation would permit Utah residents 
who are injured while employed outside of this state to subject 
general contractors, subcontractors and their employees to a 
negligence lawsuit in the courts of this state. That risk would 
not exist if no Utah residents contractors or subcontractors were 
present on an out of state project. Applying Utah law to the 
instant case would create a great disincentive to hire or employ 
residents or contractors of this state. The risk of having to 
answer a negligence lawsuit in Utah would exist for every 
participant on an out of state project whenever a Utah contractor 
or subcontractor was working on the job site. In order to avoid 
the risk of tort liability in a Utah courtroom/ owners of 
projects as well as general contractors or others responsible for 
letting contracts would systematically refuse to give contracts 
or work to individuals or companies from this State. See Howe v. 
Diversified Builders. Inc.. 69 Cal.Rptr. 56,59 (Cal.App.2d 1968). 
In order to resolve a conflict of law using an interest 
analysis the interests of the forum must be considered. Utah's 
interest in seeing its citizen compensated has been mostly 
satisfied through the workers' compensation law of this state. 
The lesser State interest of permitting a citizen to pursue a 
negligent tort claim would be slightly impaired if Nevada law is 
applied to this dispute. The impairment of that interest, 
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however, is minor when compared to the significant detriment to 
Utah citizens, contractors and subcontractors that would result 
if it is decided that Utah law should govern this dispute. When 
only Utah's interests are considered, public policy demands that 
Nevada law govern this dispute. 
ii. Nevada's Interests In; Conduct Within its 
Borders: Protection of Those Working and 
Doing Business Within Its Boundaries And 
Recognition of the Exclusive Remedy 
Provisions of Its Workers Compensation Laws 
Also Favor the Application of Nevada's Law to 
the Dispute 
Plaintiff contends "that Nevada has no legitimate 
interest in preventing Utah from providing Shaw with a right of 
action for damages against a third party..." (Plaintiff's Brief 
at 14). That position reveals an extremely narrow vision of the 
facts, circumstances, issues and policies at stake in this 
controversy. Nevada has a greater interest in the application of 
its laws to the present lawsuit than any other state. The State 
of Nevada was the owner and overseer of the Nevada Project; 
Nevada is a potential defendant in this lawsuit; because it was a 
Nevada Union job it can be assumed that a significant number of 
Nevada residents and subcontractors were employed to complete the 
Nevada project; and the injury and actions at the heart of this 
lawsuit occurred in Nevada: 
The function of Workers Compensation Law in an 
industrialized society is easy to understand in terms 
of making physical losses suffered by employees a part 
of the cost of operation to be borne not only by 
injured individuals and their families but by the 
employment enterprise as a whole, ultimately to be 
passed on to its customers as part of the cost of the 
product or service provided for their use. 
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Leflar, R.; McDougall, L.; and Felix, R. American Conflicts Law 
(4th ed.) § 158 p. 447. 
Workers7 compensation laws also represent a quid pro 
quo which bestows both benefits and detriments upon all parties 
to the trade off. See generally A. Larson The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation § 88.00 et seq. 16-171 through 16-213; and 
Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law § § 180 through 185 pp 536 
through 555. The employer must provide workers' compensation 
insurance to pay for all work related injuries regardless of 
fault. In exchange for that benefit the employee surrenders his 
right to pursue other remedies. Wilson, 141 A.2d at 776. 
Because of the quid pro quo in the present situation both Nevada 
and Utah have an interest in seeing that the injured employee 
receive compensation. Nevertheless, when an injured employee 
seeks to maintain a tort action against a party who has been 
granted immunity by one of the state's laws requiring the 
provision of workers' compensation protection, the law of the 
state providing freedom from liability is generally applied. 
Eger, 539 A.2d 1217; citing Wilson 141 A.2d at 774-775. To 
ignore the exclusive remedy provision of one state workers' 
compensation law would do violence to the quid pro quo of 
workers' compensation. 
Plaintiff may argue that only his employer provided him 
with Workers' Compensation protection and therefore should be the 
only entity that should be protected from liability. The laws of 
Nevada, however, require that the general contractor remain 
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ultimately liable for payment of workers' compensation benefits. 
Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 616.085 and 616.270. In order to comply with 
its obligation, the general contractor incurs a cost. As a 
result of that cost the employee receives a benefit, additional 
protection for work related injuries. Plaintiff may also argue 
that the same trade off does not justify the extension of the 
immunity provided by Nevada's Workers' Compensation Act to 
subcontractors. The costs to the general contractor, however, 
are passed on to# and ultimately borne by, the subcontractors on 
the job. Furthermore, all the subcontractors on a job enter into 
a similar quid pro quo. All of the subcontractors and their 
employees give up their right to sue any of their co-employees 
and in return receive immunity from negligence lawsuits such as 
Plaintiff's. Allowing Plaintiff's lawsuit to continue would 
modify Nevada's statutory scheme for providing protection to 
employers and employees within its boundaries. See Eger, 539 
A.2d at 1219-1218. 
In addition to maintaining the integrity of its own 
workers' compensation laws Nevada has a vital and legitimate 
interest in regulating injury causing conduct within its borders. 
The United States Supreme Court held that: "few matters could be 
deemed more appropriately the concern of the state in which the 
injury occurs or more completely within its power [than] the 
bodily safety and economic protection of employees injured within 
it." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Cmm'n. 306 
U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L. Ed. 946 (1939). See also Hudson 
28 
317 P.2d and Wood 332 P.2d. 
Nevada has exempted some out of state employees from 
the provisions of its workers' compensation law. Nev. Rev. Stat. 
S 616.260(1) (1986). The Nevada legislature, however, has 
declared an express interest in regulating all employees from 
within or without of the state on jobs where the total value 
exceeds Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000). The 
express waiver of that exemption is set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§ 616.260(3). The cost of the Nevada Project was several times 
$250,000. The contract between Plaintiff's employer and Layton 
was for over One Million One Hundred Thousand Dollars 
(1,100,000). To infringe upon the express interests of Nevada 
would not only create confusion it would violate principles of 
comity. See Jackett v. Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power. 771 P.2d 1074, 1076-1077 (Utah App. 1989). 
Once it is determined that Nevada law should govern 
this cause of action it becomes necessary to determine what 
effect Nevada Law would have on plaintiff's Complaint. In Meers 
v. Hauahton Elevator. 701 P.2d 1006, 1007 (Nev. 1985) the Nevada 
Supreme Court stated that •• [i]t is well established that 
employees and persons in the same employ as a person injured in 
the course of employment, are immune from liability under the 
Nevada Industrial Insurance Act" (emphasis added). Pursuant to 
Nevada Rev. Stat. § 616.560 (1986) "a person 'in the same employ' 
as a claimant is relieved from Common Law liability for damages 
resulting from injuries entitled to compensation under the 
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Workman's Compensation Statute.11 Watson v. G. C. Associates Ltd. 
Partnership. 691 P.2d 416, 418 (Nev. 1984); citing Howard v. 
Eighth J. Dist. Ct.. 640 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Nev. 1982); and 
Araaonez v. Taylor Steel Co.. 462 P.2d 754, 755 (1969). The 
issue in the case at hand, therefore, is whether plaintiff and 
defendant Steel Deck were Min the same employ" and therefore, 
whether Steel Deck is protected by statute from plaintiffs 
claim. Pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 616.085 and 616.116 
subcontractors, independent contractors and their employees are 
all considered to be employees of the principal or general 
contractor. In Meers the Nevada Supreme Court specifically 
recognized that "in the construction business, subcontractors and 
independent contractors will invariably be held to be statutory 
employees of the general contractor. Meers, 701 P.2d at 1007. 
In the case at hand Steel Deck and plaintiff were both performing 
work under subcontract agreements in furtherance of Layton's 
general construction contract of the Nevada Project. They are 
co-employees pursuant to Nevada law. Nevada law shields Steel 
Deck from liability for Plaintiff's injuries which are at the 
heart of this action. Plaintiff's claim against Steel Deck, 
therefore, should be found to be barred by statute and the 
decision of the trial court upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary issue in this case is a conflict of 
law. In Utah lex loci delicti governs the substantive rights of 
the parties while procedural issues are resolved pursuant to Utah 
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law. Because the conflict in question deals with the parties' 
substantive rights the law of the place of the wrong should 
apply. Because plaintiff's injuries as well as the acts and or 
omissions which allegedly caused those injuries all occurred in 
Nevada the law of Nevada should govern the substantive rights of 
the parties. 
If this Court elects to pursue a new course for choice 
of law in Utah, either by way of a Mmost significant contacts" 
test or an "interest analysis" Nevada law should still govern 
Plaintiff's Complaint. The accident occurred in Nevada, the 
injuries were incurred in Nevada, there are parties from various 
domiciles involved in this matter and the relationship of all 
involved was wholly centered in Nevada. Taking the interests of 
both jurisdictions into account the conclusion is the same. Utah 
wants to see its residents compensated. Plaintiff has been 
compensated. Even though Plaintiff's recovery could be somewhat 
diminished by the application of Nevada's law to this dispute the 
burden upon all of the contractors, subcontractors and 
individuals from Utah who seek work out of state is too great to 
permit Plaintiff to maintain this action in the Courts of Utah. 
Furthermore, Nevada has an expressed interest in those who work 
and receive compensation within its boarders. It has implemented 
a comprehensive workers' compensation scheme to protect and 
promote that interest. If this Court refuses to acknowledge that 
interest and applies Utah law to this dispute Nevada will be 
severely prejudiced. 
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According to Nevada law co-employees are free from 
liability for injuries sustained by co-employees during the 
course and scope of their employment. Plaintiff and Steel Deck 
were co-employees. Plaintiff is now trying to recover in tort 
for injuries he received on the job, allegedly as the result of 
acts and/or omissions of Steel Deck's employees in furtherance of 
its subcontract agreement for construction of the Nevada Project. 
The claim that Plaintiff is attempting to bring is barred by 
Nevada substantive law. We, therefore respectfully submit that 
the trial court was correct in its rulings and the lower court's 
decision should be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ftO™ dav of October, 
1993. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Steel Deck Erectors, Inc. 
Steven B. Smith 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that 2 copies of the foregoing Brief were 
mailed first class mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
October, 1993, to the following: 
Steven B. Wall, Esq. 
Cory B. Wall, Esq. 
WALL & WALL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Lee Henning, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendant - Layton Construction Co., Inc. 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
STEVEN B. SMITH, Esq. 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A" 
any compensation due the employee which was awarded or accrued but for 
which a check was not issued or delivered at the date of death of the employee 
is payable to his dependents as defined in NRS 616.615. (1947, p. 592; 1955, p 
71; 1979, p. 1055; 1983, p. 1880; 1985, p. 1434.) 
Crom reference*. — AJ to execution* tnd under the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act 
exemption*, tee NHS 21.010 to 21340. A* to tee NHS 106.590 
hocpitAJ lien* not valid against person coming 
OPINIONS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
The federal government, under the tax- to recover delinquent taxes AGO 260 
inf power, can garnish moneys payable (5-1-1957). 
from the commission to its claimants in order 
616,555. Compensation of nonresident alien dependents. 
Payments to the consul general, vice consul general, consul or vice consul of 
the nation of which any dependent of a deceased employee is a resident or 
subject, or a representative of such consul general, vice consul general, congu] 
or vice consul, of any compensation due under this chapter to any dependent 
residing outside of the United States, any power of attorney to receive or 
receipt for the same to the contrary notwithstanding, shall be as fill] a 
discharge of the benefits or compensation payable under this chapter as if 
payments were made directly to the beneficiary. (1947, p. 592; 1955, p. 71.) 
616.560. Liability of third parties for damages; reduction of compensa-
tion; subrogation of insurer to employee's rights; ben on 
proceeds of recovery; jury instructions. 
1. When an employee coming under the provisions of this chapter receives 
an injury for which compensation is payable under this chapter and which 
injury was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some 
person, other than the employer or a person in the same employ, to pay 
damages in respect thereof: 
(a) The injured employee, or in case of death, his dependents, may take 
proceedings against that person to recover damages, but the amount of the 
compensation to which the injured employee or his dependents are entitled 
under this chapter, including any future compensation under this chapter, 
must be reduced by the amount of the damages recovered, notwithstanding 
any act or omission of the employer or a person in the same employ which 
was a direct or proximate cause of the employee's injury. 
(b) If the injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, receive 
compensation under this chapter, the insurer has a right of action against 
the person so liable to pay damages and is subrogated to the rights of the 
injured employee or of his dependents to recover therefor. In any action or 
proceedings taken by the insurer under this section evidence of the amount 
of compensation, accident benefits and other expenditures which the 
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insurer has paid or become obligated to pay by reason of the injury or death 
of the employee is admissible. If in such action or proceedings the insurer 
recovers more than the amounts it has paid or become obligated to pay as 
compensation, the excess must be paid to the injured employee or his 
dependents. 
(c) The iryured employee, or in case of death his dependents, shall first 
notify the insurer in writing of any action or proceedings, pursuant to this 
section, to be taken by the employee or his dependents. 
2. In any case where the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the injured 
employee or of his dependents as provided in subsection 1, the insurer has a 
lien upon the total proceeds of any recovery from some person other than the 
employer, whether the proceeds of such recovery are by way of judgment, 
settlement or otherwise. The iiyured employee, or in the case of his death his 
dependents, are not entitled to double recovery for the same injury, 
notwithstanding any act or omission of the employer or a person in the same 
employ which was a direct or proximate cause of the employee's injury. 
3. The lien provided for under subsection 2 includes the total compensation 
expenditure incurred by the insurer for the injured employee and his 
dependents. 
4. Within 15 days of the date of recovery by way of actual receipt of the 
proceeds of the judgment, settlement or otherwise, the iryured employee or his 
representative shall notify the insurer of such recovery and pay to the insurer 
the amount due under this section together with an itemized statement 
showing the distribution of the total recovery 
5. In any trial of an action by the injured employee, or in the case of his 
death by his dependents, against a person other than the employer or a person 
in the same employ, the jury shall receive proof of the amount of all payments 
made or to be made by the insurer The court shall instruct the jury 
substantially as follows 
(a) "Payment of workmen's compensation benefit* by the insurer is based 
upon the fact that a compensable industrial accident occurred, and does not 
depend upon blame or fault If the plaintiff does not obtain a judgment in 
his favor in this case, he is not required to repay his employer or the insurer 
any amount paid to him or paid on his behalf by his employer or by the 
insurer"; and 
(b> "If you decide that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant, you shall find his damages in accordance with the court's 
instructions on damages and return your verdict in the plaintiffs favor in 
the amount so found without deducting the amount of any compensation 
benefits paid to or for the plaintiff The law provides a means by which any 
compensation benefits will be repaid from your award " (1947, p 595; 1949, 
p 659; CL 1929 (1949 Supp ), § 2680.75,1957, p 519; 1973, p. 498,1977, pp. 
216, 424; 1979, p. 1055; 1981, p 1491.) 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
616.083 INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 616.085 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter < 1971. p. 249: 1973, p. 1580; 1981, p. 
487; 1985, p. 576.) 
616.083. "Employee**: Trainees in facility operated by rehabilitation di-
vision of department of human resources. 
Trainees in a rehabilitation facility operated by the rehabilitation division 
of the department of human resources, while engaged in an evaluation or 
training program and while acting under the direction or authorization of the 
rehabilitation division of the department of human resources in any county, 
city or town, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, employees of the 
rehabilitation division of the department of human resources receiving a wage 
of $200 per month, and shall be entitled to the benefits of this chapter upon 
compliance by the rehabilitation division of the department of human re-
sources. (1965, p. 92; 1967, p. 832; 1973, p. 1406.) 
Cross references. — As to determination of 
disability for vocational rehabilitation, see 
NRS 615.220. 
616.084. "Employee": Volunteer workers at facilities for inpatients of 
mental hygiene and mental retardation division of depart-
ment of human resources. 
Volunteer workers at a facility for inpatients of the mental hygiene and 
mental retardation division of the department of human resources, while act-
ing under the direction or authorization of the supervisor of volunteer services 
of such a facility, shall be deemed, for the purpose of this chapter, employees 
of the facility, receiving a wage of $350 per month, and are entitled to the 
benefits of this chapter upon compliance therewith by the facility. (1969, p. 
236; 1973, pp. 118, 1406; 1987, ch. 397, § 2, p. 921.) 
Cross references. — As to labor by clients 
of mental health centers, see NRS 433.524. 
616.085. "Employee": Subcontractors and employees. 
1. Except as otherwise provided in NRS 616.262, subcontractors, indepen-
dent contractors and the employees of either shall be deemed to be employees 
of the principal contractor for the purposes of this chapter. 
2. If the subcontractor is a sole proprietor or partnership licensed pursuant 
to chapter 624 of NRS, the sole proprietor or partner shall be deemed to 
receive a wage of $500 per month for the purposes of this chapter. 
3. This section does not affect the relationship between a principal contrac-
tor and a subcontractor or independent contractor for any purpose outside the 
scope of this chapter. (1947, p. 571; 1951. p. 485; 1987, ch. 771, § 3, p. 2047; 
1991, ch. 723, § 42, p. 2399.) 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
616.270 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL IELATTOHS 616.270 
61&270. Employers to provide compensation; relief from HibOity* 
1. Every employer within the provisions of this chapter, end those 
employers who shall accept the terms of this chapter and be governed by its 
provisions, as in this chapter provided, shall provide and secure compensation 
according to the terms, conditions and provisions of this chapter for any and 
all persona] injuries by accident sustained by an employee arising out of and 
in the course of the employment. 
2. Travel for which an employee receives wages shall, for the purposes of 
this chapter, be deemed in the course of employment 
3. In such cases the employer shall be relieved from other liability for 
recovery of damages or other compensation for such personal iiyury, unless by 
the terms of this chapter otherwise provided. (TJ&Zo^ 57Zt£L-W2$HtS?9\ 
CASE NOTES 
I General Consideration 
II Injury Arising Out of and In Course di Employment 
III Exclusivity of Act 
IV. Provision of Coverage by Employer 
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION. 
CH*d in: Simon Serv lnc v Mitchell. 73 
Nev 9.307P.2d 110 < 1957». Tab Constr Co v 
Eighth Judicial Dial Court. 83 Nev 364 432 
P 2d 90 11967». Heiunan v Bank o( Las Vegas 
87 Nev 201. 484 P 2d 572 <1971\* Nevada 
Indus Commn v Reese. 93 Ne\ 115.560 P 2d 
1352 11977 K Spencer v Harrah s lnc . 98 Ne\ 
99. 641 P2d 481 (1982'. Lewis v United 
States. 680 F 2d 68 <9th Cir 1982 
II INJURY ARISING OLT OF AND IN 
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
Nefbgence of felJom employee. — When 
an employee is injured on the job a* a result of 
the negligence of a fellom employee, hi* rem 
edv is compensation under the Nevada Indus 
trial Insurance Act Leslie v J A Tiberu 
Constr Co . 99 Nex 494 664 P 2d 963 < 1983 
Assault while at work — Where an em 
ployee is assaulted and injury is inflicted upon 
him through ammosit> and ill will ansinf 
from some cause wholly disconnected with the 
employers business or the employment the 
employee cannot recover compensation simpl> 
because he is assaulted when he is in the 
discharge of his duties Under such circum 
stances, the injury does not arise out of the 
course of employment, and the emplo>ment is 
not the cause of the injury. although it may be 
the occasion of the willful act and may furnish 
the opportunity for its execution McColl v 
Scherer, 73 Nev 226, 315 P.2d 807*1957). 
Assault by insane coem ployee. — Em-
ployee's death, as a matter of law, arose out of 
the employment, where be was assaulted in 
the course of his employment by an insane 
fellow emplovee Cumnung* ? United Reaon 
Hotels, lnc . 85 Nev 23. 449 P.2d 245 (1969-
Shooting of employee. — In a personal 
injury action brought against a club owner by 
s WSJtress who was shot by a customer while 
on dut\ summary judgment for the employer 
on grounds that she was covered by the Indus-
trial Insurance Act was improper, where there 
was no determination as to whether her injury 
resulted from being placed in a position of 
dMngtr by reason of her employment or was the 
result of enmity, fmdgt. or other personal 
relationship McColl v Scherer. 73 Nev 226. 
315 P 2d 807 < 1957, 
Recreational activity. — Recreational ac 
tivity should not be deemed to be within the 
course of employment unless it is s regular 
incident of employment, or is required by the 
employer, or is of direct benefit to the employer 
beyond the intangible value of employee 
health and morale common to all kinds of 
recreation and social life. thus, where it was 
not a regular incident of employee's employ 
ment to enjov recreation on his day off at golf 
driving range, and his employer did not re-
quire his presence there, nor did the employer 
receive a direct benefit from that off-duty 
activity beyond the intangible value of em-
ployee health and morale common to all kinds 
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EXHIBIT "D" 
35-1-62 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of Sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 72; C.L. 1917, L. 1945, ch. 65, § 1; 1971, ch. 76, § 3; 1973, 
§ 3133; L. 1921, ch. 100, § 1; R.S. 1933, ch. 67, § 7; 1975, ch. 101, § 3. 
42-1-58; L. 1939, ch. 51, § 1; C. 1943, 42-1-58; 
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EXHIBIT "E" 
35-1-54 LABOR - INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
35-1-54- Employee injured outside state — Entitled to com-
pensation — Limitation of time. 
If an employee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state 
receives personal injury by accident arising out of and m the course of such 
employment outside of this state, he, or his dependents in case of his death 
shall be entitled to compensation according to the law of this state. This 
provision shall apply only to those injuries received by the employee within 
six months after leaving this state, Unless prior to the expiration of such six 
months period the employer has filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah 
notice that he has elected to extend such coverage a greater period of time. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 65; C.L. 1917, 
§ 3126; R.S. 1933, 42-1-52; L. 1941, ch. 37, 
§ 1; C. 1943, 42-1-52. 
ANALYSIS 
Employees of foreign corporation 
Foreign compensation Jaws 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Operation and effect 
Words and phrases defined 
Cited 
Employees of foreign corporation. 
Since relation of employer and employee ex-
isted between foreign transportation company 
and truck driver in this state at time of injury, 
Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to 
make award, and such power in nowise de-
pended upon reading into his contract of em-
ployment the law of Colorado where the con-
tract was made, for when employer sent his 
employee into Utah to work for it there, it sub-
jected itself to this chapter Buckingham 
Transp Co v Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 
342, 72 P2d 1077 (1937) 
Employer or its insurance earner are not re-
quired to make payments to injury benefit fund 
where airline stewardess, employed in Califor-
nia by employer with its principal offices in 
California, is killed in course of temporary em-
ployment in Utah leaving no surviving depen-
dents United Air Lines Transp Corp v Indus-
tna) Comm'x, JJD Utah 590, J75 P2d 152 
(1946) 
Foreign compensation laws. 
In action by employee for personal injuries 
arising in state of Wyoming, defense that Wyo-
ming had adopted Workmen's Compensation 
Act, and that such act furnished adequate and 
exclusive remedy to employee to recover com-
pensation, was sustained Bozo v Central Coal 
& Coke Co , 54 Utah 289, 180 P 432 (1919) 
Resident employee who was injured in 
course of employment in another state was en-
titled to compensation for such injuries, al-
though employer was insured under lawB of 
other state Pickenngv Industrial Comm'n, 59 
Utah 35, 201 P 1029 (1921) 
In the absence of proof it will be presumed 
that the provisions of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act of another state are the same at 
those of the forum ShurthfT v Oregon Short 
Line RR, 66 Utah 161, 241 P 1058 (1925X 
Injuries in interstate commerce. 
Industrial Commission had power to maka 
award under this section for injury to trucker 
employed by foreign corporation under foreign 
contract notwithstanding that trucker was ia 
interstate commerce when injured Bucking-
ham Transp Co v Industnal Comm'n, 93 
Utah 342, 72 P 2d 1077 (1937) 
Operation and effect. 
If employer-employee relationship is maia-
tained in this state, Industrial Commission hat 
jurisdiction to make an award notwithstanding 
that original contract of employment was ear 
tered into in foreign state and that injury ee* 
curred in foreign state Fay v Industrial 
Comm'n, 100 Utah 542, 114 P 2d 508 (19411, 
Commission had right to award compenan* 
tion for death of salesman occurring m Idaht* 
under first sentence of this section, nolwtth* 
standing that original contract of employmeafc 
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EXHIBIT "F" 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-44 
Educ of Alpine School Dist. v Olsen, 684 P.2d sociation, recipient was "employee,*' associa-
49 (Utah 1984). tion was "employer" and "contract of hire" ex-
. . isted within meaning of this section, as 
Welfare or relief recipients. amended m 1945, so as to entitle injured recip-
Under voluntary arrangement between two . . . , * 
^ . 1
 r A j LI lent to compensation, where association was 
state agencies, state fair association and public , , , r „ c L 
welfare department, pursuant to fetter's plan r ^ m r e d *y w e l f a r e " J ™ * ™ *> f u r n i s ^ 
Jo compel welfare recipients who were able to compensation insurance for such workers, and 
work to work out their relief payments on cer- h a d "ght to *"». fire> con t ro l> supervise and 
tain projects, whereby such recipients were di- regulate pay of them, although payment of 
rected to report to association for work and compensation and relief payments were made 
were placed by latter under supervision and by welfare board. Commission of Fin. v. Indus-
control of its superintendent of fairgrounds at trial Comm'n, 113 Utah 73, 191 P.2d 598 
work having substantial economic value to as- (1948). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 59 et seq. •= 230. 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be construed as follows: 
(1) "Order" shall mean and include any decision, rule, regulation, di-
rection, requirement or standard of the commission, or any other determi-
nation arrived at, or decision made, by such commission. 
(2) "General order" shall mean and include an order applying gener-
ally throughout the state to all persons, employments or places of employ-
ment of a class under the jurisdiction of the commission. All other orders 
of the commission shall be considered special orders. 
(3) "Welfare" shall mean and include comfort, decency and moral well-
being. 
(4) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any employment or place of em-
ployment, shall mean such freedom from danger to the life, health or 
welfare of employees as the nature of the employment will reasonably 
permit. 
(5) "Personal injury by accident arising out of or in the course of em-
ployment" shall include any injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because of his employment. It shall 
not include a disease, except as it shall result from the injury. 
(6) "Compensation" shall mean the payments and benefits provided for 
in this title. 
(7) "Award" shall mean the finding or decision of the commission as to 
the amount of compensation due any injured, or the dependents of any 
deceased, employee. 
(8) "Average weekly earnings" shall mean the average weekly earn-
ings arrived at by the rules provided in Section 35-1-75. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 52; C.L. 1917, 
I 3112; L. 1921, ch. 67, § 1; R.S. 1933 & C. 
1*43, 42-1-42. 
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EXHIBIT "G" 
616.255 INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 616 260 
SCOPE AND OPERATION 
616.255. Applicability to interstate commerce and certain plans for 
benefits in effect before July 1, 1947. 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation, 
Health and Welfare. 1987 Pac L J Rev Nev 
Legis 117. 
616.256. Plans for benefits in effect before July 1, 1947: Determination 
of sufficiency; applicability of chapter. 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review of Selected Nevada Legislation, 
Health and Welfare, 1987 Pac L J Rev Nev 
Legis 117 
616.260. Exemption of employer and employee temporarily within 
state; exception; effect of employee working in another 
state where coverage required. 
/ 1. Except as limited in subsection 3, any emDlovee who has been hired 
I outside of this state and his employer are exempted from the provisions of this 
j chapter while the employee is temporarily within this state doing work for his 
I emplover if his employer has furnished industrial insurance coverage under 
t the industrial insurance act or similar laws of a state other than Nevada so as 
i^to cover the emDlovee s employment while in tms state, proviaec 
(a) The extraterritorial provisions of this chapter are recognized in the 
^^other state, and 
/ (b) Employers and employees who are covered in this state are iiKewise 
/ exempted from the application of the industrial insurance act or similar 
Inlaws of the other state. 
The benefits under the industrial insurance act or similar laws of the other 
state are the exclusive remedy aeainst the emplover for any lniury. wnetner 
resulting in death or not, received by the employee while working for trie 
employer in this state. 
2. A certificate from the administrator or similar officer of another state 
certifying that the emDloyer of the other state is insured therein and has 
provided extraterritorial coverage insuring his emDlovees while working 
withm this state is prima facie evidence that the employer carried the maus-
rtrial insurance. 3. The exemption provided for in this section does not apply to the em-ployees of a contractor, as defined in NRS 624.020, operating withm the scope 
l^j>f his license on a project whose cost as a whole exceeds S250,000 
4. An employer is not required to pay premiums to the system for an em-
ployee who has been hired or is regularly employed in this state, but who is 
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616.263 LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL RELATK 616.265 
performing work exclusively in another state, if the otr.er state requires the 
employer to provide coverage for the employee in the otner state If the em-
ployee receives personal injury by accident ansins: out of ana m the course of 
his employment, any claim for compensation must be filed in the state m 
which the accident occurred, and such compensation is the exclusive remedy 
of the employee or his dependents. This subsection does not prevent an em-
ployer from maintaining coverage for the employee under the provisions of 
this chapter. (1947, p. 594, 1955, p. 187: 1981, p. 1464. 1989. ch. 276, § 1, p. 
578; 1989, ch. 325, § 1, p. 682.) 
Editor's note. — This section was amended ment by ch 276. § 1. as amended bv ch 325, 
by two 1989 acts which do not appear to con- § 1, in the introductory paragraph of subsec-
flict and have been compiled together tion 1, added "ExceDt as limited in subsection 
Effective date. — Acts 1989, ch 276. § 1 3" at the beginning of the DaraeraDh added 
became effective October 1 1989 Acts 1989 the present subdivision Kai ano redesignated 
ch 325 ^ 1 became effective June 13, 1989 the rormer subdivisions Itai and Kb) as the 
pursuant to ch 325 } 2 present subdivisions Kb) and l(o. resDectively, 
Effect of amendment. — The 1989 amend- and added suosections 3 and 4 
616.263. Real estate broker or salesman who hires independent con-
tractor not considered employer. 
Any person licensed pursuant to the provisions of chaDter 645 of NRS who 
engages an independent contractor to maintain or reoair DroDertv on Denaif of 
an individual property owner or an association oi proDerxy owners is not a 
statutory employer for the purposes of this cnamer * 19b7. en 199 $ 4, p 
450 ) 
LEGAL PERIODICALS 
Review oi Selected Nevada Legislation 
WorKers Compensation, 19&7 Pac LJ Re\ 
Nev Legis 219 
616.265. Devices modifying liability void; exception. 
1. Except as otherwise provided in suosection 1 
(a) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any 
other device, does not modif\, change or waive any liability created by this 
chapter. 
(b) A contract of employment, insurance, relief benefit, indemnity, or any 
other device, having for its purpose the waiver or modification of the terms 
or liability created by this chapter is void 
2. Nothing in this section prevents an owner or lessor of real property from 
requiring an employer \sho is leasing the real property from agreeing to in-
sure the owner or lessor of the property against any liability for repair or 
maintenance of the premises (1947, p. 572, CL 1929 11949 Supp ), § 2680.25 
1989, ch. 5S2, & 1, p 1245 ) 
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